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NOTES
SECURITIES REGULATION: NONDISCLOSURE OF INSIDER INFORMATION
Chiarella v. United States
Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a Wall Street printing firm,
deduced from limited information he received during the course of
his employment the names of target companies and acquiring com-
panies involved in five separate tender-offer takeover bids. Acting
on this information, he made several purchases of target company
stock before the tender offers were announced publicly, and he pro-
fited thereby. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in-
dicted Chiarella on seventeen counts' of "willful misuse of material,2
nonpublic information in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities," purportedly in violation of section 10(b)3 of the Securities
1. The indictments were brought under section 32(a), the criminal provision of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976):
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section
78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is
made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this
chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made,
any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in
a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78(o) of this title
or by any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for
membership or participation therein or to become associated with a member
thereof, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both, except that when such person is an exchange, a fine not
exceeding $500,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprison-
ment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves
that he had no knowledge of such rule. or regulation.
Each count of the seventeen indictments represented a confirmation slip mailed to
Chiarella, verifying his transactions in the securities which he made by telephone. The
mailings were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under the securities laws. United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978).
2. The information concerning the impending tender offers was stipulated to be
material. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978).
3. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-54 of the SEC. The second circuit
upheld the lower court's conviction,5 concluding that Chiarella's con-
duct did violate rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the petitioner had no affirmative duty to disclose the informa-
tion before trading in the securities and therefore was improperly
convicted. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
Trading on "insider information" is prohibited by section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 of the securities regulations, which were adopted as a
portion of the New Deal's response to the financial disaster begin-
ning October 29, Black Tuesday, 1929. The collapse of the securities
market was caused mainly by the pervasive deceit, fraud, manipula-
tion, and concealment of facts in regard to securities purchased by
the public investor.' The rule prohibiting trading on "insider infor-
mation"-a circumstance in which purchases or sales are made by
persons who have access to information which is not available to
those with whom they trade-evolved from section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The 1934 Act was a safeguard to
4. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
5. This was the first criminal prosecution under section 10(b) for nondisclosure.
Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1118 n.20 (1980). The regulations make
available civil actions to injured parties whose stocks are involved in insider trans-
actions.
6. The securities regulations adopted during the depression of 1929 to 1933 were
not the original brainchild of the New Deal administration. The regulations followed a
history of securities regulation beginning in England in 1285, when Edward I
authorized the licensing of brokers in the City of London. For a detailed history of
securities legislation, see generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3-158 (2d ed.
1961).
7. The acts promulgated by Congress purporting to prohibit fraudulent acts in
regard to securities regulation were based on common law notions of fraud. "Statutes
build on the common law and, especially when statutes are new, judges and lawyers
who are trained in the common law are apt to look to it for guidance." 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1430 (2d ed. 1961). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (referred
to as the 1934 Act) was preceded by the Securities Act of 1933. The Act of 1933 was
adopted to police the sale of new stock issues or distributions of outstanding securities.
The 1934 Act was targeted at the trading markets to protect investors from price
manipulations. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.2, at 16 (1979).
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protect investors from manipulation of stocks on the trading
markets, and section 10(b) was designed to be a catchall The 1934
Act was concerned only with the manipulation of stock prices on the
trading markets. Until 1941, section 10(b) prohibited only fraudulent
acts in connection with the sale of securities. In 1942, SEC rule
10b-5 was drafted to encompass fraudulent acts in connection with
the purchase of securities by any person
Developed largely by court decisions, rule 10b-5 has had its most
important applications in imposing sanctions on insider trading
situations. During the 1960's and early 1970's the applicability of
8. Thomas G. Corcoran, a member of the Roosevelt Administration, explained
this section [10(b)] of the first revision of the bill: "Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices.' . . . Of course subsection (c) is a catchall clause to
prevent manipulative devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to that kind of
clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative
devices." The devices Corcoran was concerned with here were short sales, stop-loss
orders, puts, straddles, and various other securities transactions which are subject to
manipulation. STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION HEARINGS BEFORE HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE ON H.R. 7852 AND H.R. 8720, 73d Congress, 2d Sess. 115
(19 3 4 ). ,
9. Before the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5, the SEC had to rely on section 17 of the
1933 Act, which covers only offers to sell or actual sales. By combining section 17 with
section 10(b), Milton Freeman, an SEC staff attorney, in 1941 drafted rule 10b-5. Rule
10b-5 was motivated by an incident that came to the SEC's attention in 1942 in which
a corporate officer was purchasing stock from shareholders without disclosing non-
public information known to the officer. See Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C.
373 (1943). Mr. Freeman narrated the casual origin of the rule years later:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and EKchange Division. He said, "I have just
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Ad-
ministrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own
shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is
doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and
will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?"
So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and
I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had
there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we
decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper.
around to all.the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it
happened.
Louis is absolutely right that I never thought that twenty-odd years later it
would be the biggest thing that ever happened.
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922
(1967).
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rule 10b-5 was expanded through decisions of the SEC and of the
Supreme Court"° that interpreted the congressionally-intended func-
tions of rule 10b-5 to encompass a broader range of persons subject
to its sanctions. This group included individuals whose liability
resulted from nondisclosure or "silence" as was considered in
Chiarella.
The first category of insiders to be held liable under the regula-
tions for nondisclosure of material corporate information were
corporate officers and directors." In Kardon v. National Gypsum
Company,'2 the two plaintiffs (father and son) and the two defen-
dants (brothers) each owned one-fourth of the stock in a corporation
in which they were also corporate officers. The defendants secretly
negotiated the sale of their paper products manufacturing
company's assets to National Gypsum for $1,500,000. Without dis-
closing these negotiations, the defendants purchased from each
plaintiff their respective one-fourth stock ownership in the corpora-
tion for $504,000. The defendants consummated the transaction with
National Gypsum shortly thereafter. The Kardon court determined
that the defendant corporate officers had violated rule 10b-5 since
the rule imposed upon the defendants an affirmative duty to dis-
close, based on the fiduciary obligations 3 inherent in the defendants'
insider status. 4
10. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Mountain States
Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11. Along with corporate officers and directors, controlling shareholders who
were neither officers nor directors were held to be subject to an affirmative duty to
disclose. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
12. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. The fiduciary obligations of the corporate officers created an affirmative duty
to disclose material information, as discussed in the Restatement of Torts and by Loss.
"[Tihere is still not common law liability in deceit for complete non-disclosure, as
distinguished from a half truth, unless the one party to a business transaction 'by con-
cealment or other action' intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material
information," RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 550 (1938), or the one party is under a duty to
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question "because of a
fidicuary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them."-Id. at § 551
(2)(a). See 3 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1434.
14. The court relied on established principles of fiduciary relationships to impose
liability on the corporate officers and to give rule 10b-5 effect.
Perhaps all that would be necessary for this decision would be the determination
that the conduct of the defendants came within the terms of the Act [Securities
[Vol. 411298
Later decisions extended the liability standards of corporate
officers and directors for nondisclosure of material insider informa-
tion to tippees. In re Cady, Roberts & Company,"5 an SEC pro-
ceeding, presented a situation in which Cady, Roberts, a brokerage
firm, employed Cowdin, who was also on the board of Curtis-Wright
Corporation. The Curtis-Wright Corporation recently had announced
its invention of an innovative internal combustion engine. Curtis-
Wright's stock price increased steadily for several months. The
board of Curtis-Wright, with Cowdin present, decided to declare a
lower dividend than customarily had been paid, in light of the
stock's price rise. Cowdin quickly telephoned an associate at Cady,
Roberts, who executed several transactions on the basis of this in-
formation. The SEC proceeding followed shortly thereafter, con-
cluding that both Cady, Roberts and Cowdin's partner, whom Cowdin
had "tipped off," had willfully violated section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and rule 10b-5. After considering the traditional obligations of cor-
porate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, the Commis-
sion determined:
These three groups (officers, directors and controlling
shareholders), however, do not exhaust the classes of persons
upon whom there is such an obligation. Analytically, the obliga-
tion rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent un-
fairness involved where a party takes advantage of such infor-
mation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal-
ing. In considering these elements under the broad language of
the antifraud provision we are not to be circumscribed by fine
distinctions and rigid classifications."l
The Commission held that persons who had received tips from corpo-
rate insiders could be held liable for trading on inside information.
The extension of liability to tippees was necessary to effectively
deter insider trading, since corporate insiders would be able to cir-
cumvent liability by disclosing material, nonpublic information to
Exchange Act of 1934] and the remedy sought is one provided by law for redress.
However, the broad terms of the Act are to be made effective in a case like the
present one through application of well known and well established equitable prin-
ciples governing fiduciary relationships.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
15. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
16. Id. at 912.
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third parties." This expansion of rule 10b-5 to tippees also was
premised on the existence of a fiduciary responsibility, as in the
Kardon case, since the duty to disclose was intertwined with a "rela-
tionship giving access, directly or indirectly"' to corporate informa-
tion-a relationship enjoyed by the traditional corporate insider.
Beginning with SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,"9 the second circuit
became aware of an additional possible purpose of rule 10b-5: the
broad intention of Congress to give all investors equal access to the
rewards of participation in the securities marketplace, including
equal access to material information.' The Texas Gulf Sulphur Corpo-
ration was involved in exploratory mineral drilling operations on
properties near Timmons, Ontario in late November, 1963. The first
test core revealed a strike of unheard of proportions of copper, zinc,
and silver. Just a few days after examination of the test core,
several corporate officers, employees, and their tippees began pur-
chasing shares of TGS stock. The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur
were held civilly liable for trading on inside information. In fact, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information must either disclose that informa-
tion or refrain from trading on it." The second circuit seemed to
17. Insiders gain from releasing nonpublic information to their selected tippees
through reciprocal agreements, status, prestige, cash, or any other type of compensa-
tion. The tippee, as a selected recipient of the insider, should not be allowed to trade
on this nonpublic information; the insider is prohibited from doing this. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (emphasis added).
19. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. The second circuit voiced its theory of equal access of information by
investors in Texas Gulf Sulphur: "[Rule 10b-51 is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information ...." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. The essence of the Rule [Rule 10b-51 is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone" may not take "advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing," i.e. the investing public.
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Insiders, as directors or
management officers, are, of course, by this Rule precluded from so unfairly deal-
ing; but the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who may not
strictly be termed an "insider" within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act. ...
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or




omit the Cady, Roberts requirement of "a relationship giving
access" to inside information, but the defendants in Texas Gulf
Sulphur were all in a position or relationship with TGS which gave
access to inside information. Therefore, the court's omission of the
Cady, Roberts requirement of an "insider" relationship should not
be considered controlling."
In a later case, Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund,
Inc.,"3 the second circuit seemed to retrench from its earlier Texas
Gulf Sulphur decisions. The plaintiffs in Frigitemp alleged that
Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc. (FDF) had purchased $1,000,000 of a
50/0 convertible subordinated debenture issued by Frigitemp Corp.
without disclosing material, confidential inside information regard-
ing Frigitemp's financial status. The complaint alleged that the
defendants failed to disclose to Frigitemp their purchasing most of
the outstanding stock of Frigitemp on the basis of the insider
knowledge FDF possessed and that by so doing the defendants vio-
lated 10(b) and 10b-5. The second circuit held that "[tihe party charged
with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to
disclose it ..... "2 The second circuit, however, did not follow
Frigitemp in deciding Chiarella.
In Chiarella, the defendant was an employee of Pandick Press, a
printing firm specializing in corporate documents for Wall Street
corporations. Employed as a mark-up man, Chiarella received the in-
itial printing orders from customers and selected typefaces and page
layouts." Between September, 1975, and November, 1976, "Chiarella
handled the raw material for five separate takeover bids."2 The
takeover bids, when handed to Chiarella by the acquiring companies'
representatives, were coded with fictitious names or left with cer-
tain vital information deleted. Chiarella, however, as an experienced
stock market trader, deduced from the limited information available
to him the names of both the target companies and acquiring com-
panies. Armed with this "sure bet"2 7 information, Chiarella "bought
cheap and, soon after [the tender offer was made public], sold
dear,"2 realizing a profit of over $30,000.' The Securities and Ex-
22. In a 1968 second circuit case, General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.,
403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), the court explained: "We know of no rule of law, appli-
cable at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no
fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances
that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale."
23. 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. Id. at 282.
25. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).
26. Id. at 1363.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1362.
29. Id. at 1363.
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change Commission quickly began an investigation into Chiarella's
good fortune, not quite believing that he had stumbled into five
separate takeover wars in a row by chance. In May, 1977, the SEC
persuaded Chiarella to distribute his profits to the sellers of the
target stocks. The SEC's indictments of Chiarella soon followed. The
second circuit concluded that Chiarella's conduct violated rule 10b-5;
the court therefore upheld the lower court's conviction by referring
to the "black letter law [of Texas Gulf Sulphur] that 'anyone in
possession of material inside information must either disclose or
refrain from trading if prohibited from disclosing."30 The decision
was reached without dealing with the Texas Gulf Sulphur dicta pro-
blem and the 1975 Frigitemp case."
After considering previous SEC rulings, the court holdings in
Texas Gulf Suphur, Cady, Roberts & Company, Frigitemp, and the
intent of Congress with regard to the scope of rule 10b-5, the
Supreme Court reversed the second circuit's decision affirming
Chiarella's conviction. The Court found that a fiduciary relationship
between the parties must precipitate a duty to disclose, and that
without this duty, silence cannot amount to a violation of rule 10b-5.
The Supreme Court stated that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b)
does not arise from mere possession of non-public market informa-
tion," as the second circuit would suggest. The Court found that
Chiarella owed no affirmative duty to the sellers of the target com-
pany stocks. This outcome, however, would not seem to be the
Court's final position on the matter, since other considerations in
the opinion reflect the unsettled nature of the problem.
For example, the Solicitor General, in his brief to the Supreme
Court, forwarded another theory to uphold Chiarella's conviction.
That argument develops the tenet that the "petitioner breached a
30. Id. at 1364. The court held that "[alnyone-corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material nonpublic information, may not use that information, to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot
disclose, he must abstain from buying or selling." Id. at 1365 (emphasis in original).
This "black letter law," however, was not supported by Texas Gulf Sulphur, as the
case presented distinguishable facts.
31. In his dissent in United States v. Chiarella, Circuit Judge Meskill noted that
imposing liability on a defendant who had no fiduciary duty to speak before trading in
securities was not supported by any case. Judge Meskill stated:
The majority holds that Chiarella committed a § 10(b) violation by breaking
the "disclose or abstain" rule of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur .... However, we
have been cited no case in which even civil liability for nondisclosure has been im-
posed under § 10(b) on anyone other than an insider, the tippee of an insider, or
one standing in a special relationship with other traders.
588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
32. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1118 (1980).
1302 [Vol. 41
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duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon information
that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a
printer employed by the corporation.133 The Court wisely left the
resolution of this question for a future case, as Chiarella could not
have been prosecuted in the court under a theory which had not
been presented to the jury. According to the Solicitor General's mis-
appropriation theory, Chiarella could be found to have perpetrated a
fraud on both the tender offeror and his employer by using the infor-
mation for personal gain. Pandick Press warned its employees that
all information they received through the course of their employ-
ment was of a confidential nature and was not to be used for personal
gain, and counsel for Chiarella admitted that "[wie do not dispute
the proposition that Chiarella violated his duty as an agent of the
offeror corporations not to use their confidential information for
personal profit."3 According to the Solicitor General's theory, the
fraud would be in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
within the meaning of rule 10b-5 and therefore could be classified as
a violation.
Chief Justice Burger in dissent acknowledged the misappropria-
tion theory presented by the Solicitor General. Recognizing that no
general duty to disclose exists in arms-length transactions, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "the rule should give way when an infor-
mational advantage is obtained not by superior experience, foresight
or industry, but by some unlawful means. '3 It seems that Chief
Justice Burger would place an absolute duty to disclose information
obtained in such a fashion.
The problem with the conversion theory is that Chiarella perpe-
trated the fraud only upon the employer and the tender offeror and
not on the sellers of the stock. It would seem that Chiarella could be
prosecuted in a SEC enforcement proceeding, but perhaps the mis-
appropriation theory would be inadequate to support a private cause
of action.31 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,37 the
Supreme Court recognized and upheld the Birnbaum rule,3 which
33. Id. at 1118.
34. Id. at 1123.
35. Id. at 1120.
36. Brodskey, Trading on Inside Market Information, 183 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1980).
37. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
38. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952):
When Congress intended to protect the stockholders of a corporation against a
breach of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders, it left no doubt as to its meaning ....
15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b), expressly gave the corporate issuer or its stockholders a
right of action against corporate insiders using their position to profit in the sale
or exchange of corporate securities .... and that Rule X-10B-5 extended protec-
tion only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.
1981] 1303
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states that a private damages action under rule 10b-5 is confined to
actual purchasers or sellers of securities.39 Since the defrauded
parties (the tender offeror and Pandick Press) were neither purchasers
nor sellers of securities, a private action against Chiarella seems
unavailable; therefore, the sellers of the stock, whom the laws are
designed to protect, could obtain no relief.
Another indication that the Court might resolve this situation
differently was its mention" of proposed rule 14(e) (which became
effective October 14, 1980). Rule 14(e) was developed by the Com-
mission specifically to regulate trading in target company securities
prior to the bidder's public announcement of the intended tender
offer. Because the Commission had then proposed and has now
adopted rule 14(e), the Court may have determined that section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 were neither equipped, nor intended, to regulate a
Chiarella situation. Rule 14(e) makes any person who knows or has
reason to believe that a bidder will make a tender offer for securi-
ties and who purchases or causes to be purchased any of that com-
pany's securities before the public announcement of the tender offer
subject to liability, since this would constitute a fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative act or practice."
39. 421 U.S. at 731.
40. The Court made reference to proposed rule 14(e) in regard to warehousing:
"Significantly, however, the Commission has acted to bar warehousing under its
authority to regulate tender offers after recognizing that action under § 10(b) would
rest on a 'somewhat different theory' than that previously used to regulate insider
trading as fraudulent activity." Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1117-18
(1980). The Court pointed out that the Commission's recognition of a somewhat
different theory for liability had led it to propose 14(e) to provide an adequate regula-
tion to control warehousing and future Chiarella situations.
41. SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-88 (1979). The Commission,
following the Chiarella decision, adopted as final rule 14e-3 under regulation 14E,
pursuant to sections 14(e) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule
states in part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer [the "offering person"], it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of
the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is non-
public and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from (1) the offering person, (2) the issuer of the securities sought or to
be sought by such tender offer, or (3) any officer, director, partner or employee or
any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to
purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any
securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option
or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a
reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are
publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
SEC Final Rule § 240.14e-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 60410, 60418 (1980).
[Vol. 411304
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With the promulgation of rule 14(e), future Chiarella-like insiders
will not escape liability, as 14(e) is addressed specifically to nondis-
closure of nonpublic tender offer information. However, the court
may be faced with a similar legal scenario that does not precisely fit
the 14(e) statutory scheme or any other SEC rule. In those situa-
tions, the court will have to trace again the liability of a person
possessing inside information from Kardon (affirmative duty to
disclose as a result of the fiduciary obligations inherent in an in-
sider's status) through In re Cady, Roberts (duty to disclose arising
out of a relationship giving access to corporate information) to the
holding in Chiarella to determine the question of liability. If there is
no statutory provision, then the court probably will also be able to
consider liability based upon the Solicitor General's misappropria-
tion theory, which was strongly urged by Chief Justice Burger.
Chiarella was not convicted-but, a future "Chiarella" in a non-
tender offer situation, even absent a specific statutory provision,
may be convicted of violating 10(b) and 10b-5."
Rodolfo J. Aguilar, Jr.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas -JUVENILES'
RIGHT TO COUNSEL INSIDE THE GRAND JURY
Grand jury subpoenas were issued to David and Eric Graham,
ages 16 and 12, after their mother was found murdered in their
home. Their father filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The trial
court appointed counsel to represent the minors to avoid any possible
conflict of interest, and after the argument on the motions, the court
quashed the subpoenas. The state sought to reinstate the subpeonas
and to require the attendance of the children before the grand jury.
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that it
would violate the concepts of fundamental fairness embodied in the
42. The Court was reluctant to allow Chiarella to evade liability. It is conceivable
that had the misappropriation theory been timely advanced, Chiarella's conviction
would have been affirmed. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion reflects the attitude of
the Court:
I write simply to emphasize the fact that we have not placed any stamp of
approval on what this petitioner did, nor have we held that similar actions must
be considered lawful in the future. Rather, we have merely held that petitioner's
criminal conviction cannot rest on the theory that he breached a duty he did not
owe.
Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1120 (1980).
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